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Covert systems are designed to operate at a low probability of detection (LPD)
in order to provide system protection at the physical layer level. The classical
approach to covert communications aims at hiding the covert signal in noise by
lowering the power spectral density of the signal to a level that makes it indis-
tinguishable from that of the noise. However, the increasing demand for modern
covert systems that can provide better protection against intercept receivers (IRs)
and provides higher data rates has shifted the focus to the design of Ad-Hoc covert
networks (ACNs) that can hide their transmission in the RF spectrum of primary
networks (PNs), like mobile networks. The early work on exploiting the RF band
of other wireless systems has been promising; however, the difficulties in modeling
such environments, analyzing the impact on/from the primary network, and deriv-
ing closed form expressions for the performance of the covert network have limited
the work on this crucial subject.
In this work, we provide the first comprehensive analyses of a covert network that
exploits the RF band of an OFDM-based primary network to achieve covertness.
A spectrum access algorithm is presented which would allow the ACN to transmit
in the RF spectrum of the PN with minimum interference. Next, we use stochastic
geometry to model both the OFDM-based PN as well as the ACN. Using stochastic
geometry would also allow us to derive closed-form expressions and provide a
comprehensive analysis for two metrics, namely an aggregate metric and a ratio
metric. These two metrics quantify the covertness and performance of the covert
iii
network from the perspective of the IR and the ACN, respectively. The two metrics
are used to determine the detectability limits of an ACN by an IR.
The two metrics along with the proposed spectrum access algorithm will be used
to provide a comprehensive discussion on how to design the ACN for a target
covertness level, and analyze the effect of the PN parameters on the ACN expected
performance. This work also addresses the question of trade-off between the ACN
covertness and its achievable throughput. The overall discussion and results in
this research work illustrate the strong potential for using man-made transmissions
as a mask for covert communications. In addition, some of our results can be
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This dissertation covers the topics of spectrum access and covertness of modern covert systems
that can exploit the RF band of OFDM-based mobile wireless networks. Such covert systems
use the radio transmissions of the mobile network as a mask to hide their signal and achieve
low probability of detection. The work in this dissertation relies heavily on stochastic geometry
for the analysis and the derivation of the covert network performance. Thus, we provide an
introduction to covert communications as well as a brief introduction to the main stochastic
geometry concepts that will be used here.
1.1.1 Covert Communications
Covert communications allow two or more parties to exchange information without being de-
tected by an interceptor. This type of communication aims at hiding the transmission per se be-
cause if it is revealed, the safety of the transmitter or the integrity of the data being transmitted
could be compromised. In this regards, covert communication is fundamentally different from
encryption. In encryption [1], algorithms are used to convert data messages into codes that can
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be interpreted by authorized users only. Here, encryption does not protect against interception,
and an eavesdropper is usually assumed to know that a transmission is taking place; however,
without knowing the exact key to decrypt the data under transmission, the eavesdropper will
be unable to interpret the conveyed data. In contrast, the purpose of covert communications is
to keep the eavesdropper unaware of the transmission when it is taking place. This approach
adds another layer to data protection.
There are several methods to exploit available transmission mediums and achieve covert
communications, of those are the following:
• Steganography [2]: it is defined as the practice of concealing messages or information
within other non-secret messages or data. An example of such a method includes altering
pixels of an ordinary image or video in accordance to the letters or words of the ‘secret’
message without making this change noticeable to the eye.
• Covert Channels: the US DoD defines the covert channel as a communication channel
that can be exploited by a process to transfer information in a manner that violates the
system’s security [3]. Usually, this refers to adding bits to packet headers or even altering
unused packet bits of certain services.
• Wireless Covert Communications: a wireless system aims at hiding its radio transmis-
sions in noise [4], [5] or interference to achieve a low probability of detection (LPD) by
an intercept receiver (IR).
Wireless covert systems have been in use for several decades and many of the techniques
that were developed to achieve LPD have found their way to commercial applications. Since
the early days of wireless communications, several LPD techniques have been introduced to
hide the transmission of information over wireless channels. Traditionally, covert systems have
used spread spectrum [6] as the main method for hiding transmission over noisy channels. This
method changes the transmission frequency and/or time in order to spread the power spectral
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density of the transmitted message and make it indistinguishable from the noise [4]. The
three main spread spectrum techniques are [6]: frequency hopping, time hopping, and direct
sequence. Another covert technique that is suggested to achieve covertness is presented in [7].
The authors showed that using a wavelet-like waveform makes the covert signal look like noise
and, consequently, increases its LPD.
To counter these covert techniques, several detection methods have been proposed, and the
decision to select one of them depends on how much information is known about the signal to
be detected, i.e., carrier frequency, waveform, symbol rate. The most commonly used detection
methods are:
• Enegry Detectors (ED): energy detection methods are considered the simplest methods
to detect signals. An energy detector monitors a portion of the spectrum for a specific
amount of time, and compares the received energy to a threshold to decide whether a
signal is present or not. Energy detection methods do not utilize any prior knowledge of
the signal to be detected, and various types of energy detectors are available [8] [6].
• Matched filtering (MF): this method is used when all or some of the signal parame-
ters are known to the intercept receiver. This method is known as the optimum method
[9] for signal detection as it gives the best performance even under relatively low SNR
conditions.
• Cyclostationary Detectors: most modulated signals can be considered as cyclostation-
ary signals for reasons such as, modulation, signal structure, or the insertion of cyclo-
stationary pilots [10]. This means that some or all of the signal statistics are periodic.
This periodicity can be exploited to detect the existence of signal transmission in a noisy
environment [11], [12], and even classify it according to its modulation type [13]. The
advantage of this detection method is that, contrary to MF, does not require an exact
knowledge of all signal parameters, and contrary to ED, does not perform blind detec-
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tion.
When detection is performed, metrics need to be used to quantify the covertness of the
signal. In this regards, two metrics are widely used in traditional LPD systems: the intercept
receiver’s (IR) probability of detection, and its probability of false alarm. Regardless of the
method to be used, the performance of the detection method relies on the time-bandwidth
product of the IR as well as the signal-to-noise ratio of the covert signal.
The recent years have witnessed an increasing demand for new covert wireless systems
that can achieve higher throughput, operate in more challenging environments, and can attain
greater levels of covertness. Therefore, several covert systems that hide their signals in the
RF transmission of other wireless systems have been suggested [14, 15]; however, very little
theoretical work have been done on this subject.
OFDM-based wireless systems are good candidates for exploitation for covert communica-
tions. Those systems incorporate several innovative techniques such as Orthogonal Frequency
Division Multiplexing (OFDM), Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) antenna [16], higher
order modulation, Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request (HARQ), and Automatic Modulation and
Coding (AMC) to achieve high data rates and provide the flexibility to overcome channel varia-
tions and interference. These combined advantages make OFDM-based networks the preferred
mobile wireless systems in most countries around the world for many years to come. However,
these same advantages also open the door for researching the possibilities of exploiting these
networks in the design of various ad-hoc networks (device-to-device (D2D) communications,
covert systems [17], etc.).
This research work focuses on exploiting OFDM-based wireless systems for covert com-
munications, and providing metrics to quantify the covertness and analyze the performance of
the covert systems; an illustration of the covert network exploiting the RF band of an OFDM-
based mobile network is provided in Figure 1.1. Here, an Ad-Hoc Covert Network (ACN)










Figure 1.1: A covert network exploiting an OFDM-based multi user wireless network.
on/from the PN, the ACN users must opportunistically access the spectrum of the PN. An in-
tercept receiver (IR ) does not know if covert transmission is taking place; therefore, the IR
must scan a wider bandwidth than the transmission bandwidth of an ACN user. In this re-
search effort, we will use stochastic geometry to address the questions of the ACN achievable
throughput as well as its covertness. Stochastic geometry has gained attention in the recent
years because of the powerful tools it provides to model and analyze spatially distributed,
multi-user, dynamic networks. Therefore stochastic geometry will be used as the main tool to
build the system model and analyze the performance of the covert network.
1.1.2 Stochastic Geometry
Stochastic geometry [18] is a statistical method that provide models and methods to analyze the
complicated geometrical patterns that occur in many areas of science such as physics, biology,
and most recently wireless communications. Geometrical patterns can be frequently concerned
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with studying irregular patterns of collection of points in time and/or general, high dimensional
spaces; therefore, the theory of point processes is a closely related and an integral part of the
subject of stochastic geometry.
In order to mathematically define a point process, the following basic definitions are re-
quired:
• A set X is a collection of mathematical objects xi that are taken from a suitable domain;
that is xi ∈ X for i = 1,2, ...
• A σ-algebra is a system X of subsets of some set X and satisfy three conditions [18]:
X ∈ X;
if A ∈ X, then Ac ∈ X;




• The class of Borel sets Bd, is the smallerst σ-algebra on Rd that contains all the open
subsets of Rd.
• A function f : X→ R is measurable if for each Borel set B ∈ B, f −1(B) ∈ X
Formally, we can define a point process (PP) Φ as [18] a measurable mapping of a proba-
bility space [Ω,A,P] into a measurable space [N,N]:
Φ :Ω→ N (1.1)
where N is the family of all sequences φ of points of Rd [18], and N is its σ-algebra. Here,
this mapping results in a distribution of the PP. Figure shows several examples of realizations

















Figure 1.2: Examples of realizations of three types of point processes. (a) is an example of a
Poisson point process, (b) shows an example of a point process with gradient in the horizontal
direction, and (c) is an example of a Poisson cluster point process.
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For any PP Φ = {xi}, the notation Φ(B) refers to the number of points in the set B, while
the notation xi ∈ Φ means that a point at location x belongs to the PP Φ. In addition, any PP
can have other properties which can be summarized as follows [18]:
• Stationary point process: a PP is said to be stationary if its characteristics are invariant
under shift; that is, the characteristics of Φ = {xi} and Φ = {xi + y} are the same.
• Intensity measure: an intensity measure, Λ(B), of a PP in a given set B is defined as the
average number of points in the set B:
Λ(B) , E[Φ(B)] (1.2)
where the expectation is with respect to the different realizations φ of the PP.
• Density of a PP: the density, or intensity as some might use, of a PP Φ over a set B is





If the PP is stationary, then the density λ(x) can be written as:
λ = Λ(B)/v(B) (1.4)
where v(B) is the d-dimensional volume of B.
There are numerous types of models that can be used to capture the randomness of a PP,
such as Binomial PP (BPP), Poisson PP (PPP), Poisson cluster process (PCP), etc. Here, a
short description of the main types of PPs is provided.
• Binomial PP (BPP): This PP can be considered as the simplest type. For a bounded
region B ⊂ Rd, the number of point is a fixed number, and the points are randomly and
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uniformly distributed in the given region. Since the number of points in B is fixed, the
number of points in disjoint subsets is dependent. The number of points in a subset A
of B is a Binomial random variable that depends on the volume of both A and B. This
property makes it difficult to analyze BPP and derive closed-form expressions.
• Poisson PP (PPP): As in the BPP, the location of the points in a bounded region B is
randomly and uniformly distributed; however, in a PPP, the number of points in the
region B is a random variable of a Poisson distribution with mean Λ(B):




One of the most important properties of a PPP is that the number of points in disjoint
regions are independent random variable. This property simplifies the analysis of the
PP and can lead to easier derivation of closed-form expressions. If the PPP is stationary,
then λ =Λ(B)/|B|, and the whole distribution of the PP can be determined once the value
of λ is known [18]. Here, λ can be understood as the average number of points in unit
d-dimensional volume. Figure 1.2(a) shows a realization of a stationary PPP of density
λ = 5×10−6.
If the PPP is conditioned to have a fixed number points in a region B, then the PPP
is reduced to a BPP. A PPP has other important properties that will prove useful for
modeling and analyzing covert systems. A thinning of a PP occurs when each point of
the process is independently and randomly removed by a probability of ρ. In PPP, the
thinning of a stationary PPP Φ of density λ, results in another PPP Φρ of density ρ.
Another important property is that the super position of two stationary PPP of densities
λ1 and λ2 results in a new PPP of density λ = λ1+λ2.
• Poisson Cluster Process (PCP): This type of PP starts with a PPP Φp, also called a parent
process, of density λp. Then, each point xi ∈ Φp gives rise to a finite set of points, daugh-
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ter points, according to some distribution. Finally, all the daughter points forms a new
point process which will be a PCP. A realization example of such process is illustrated in
Figure 1.2(c).
There are also other types of point processes such as Cox PP, repulsive PP, etc.; however,
this work only focuses on the PPP because of its close relation to the distribution of wireless
transmitters. In addition, the use of stationary PPP makes it possible to obtain well compact
expressions that can be used to analyze and have an in-depth understanding of the behavior
and performance of wireless systems.
Stochastic geometry provides powerful tools to model the distribution of wireless transmit-
ters, and analyze the performance of wireless networks in the presence of interference. In fact,
stochastic geometry has been used to derived closed-form expressions for the signal-to-noise-
and-interference ratio (SINR), outage capacity, and nearest neighbor of wireless users in the
presence of interference [19]. In such system models, the intended receiver is considered as a
point of the PP, while the remaining points are considered as interferers. In order to analyze
the performance at a specific, i.e., typical, point of the PP, it is possible to use Palm distribu-
tion in order to condition the PP Φ to have a point at a specific location x; that is Φ \ {x}. In
case the effect of the point on itself needs to be ignored, the reduced Palm distribution is used.
The analysis of interference at a specific point x of the PP is an example where the reduced
Palm distribution becomes handy, because of the absence of self interference in most practical
scenarios.
Although using Palm and reduced Palm distribution might appear at first to complicate
the analysis of wireless systems, there are many cases where the analysis produces tractable
results. For example, Palm and the reduced Palm distributions are easily applied to stationary
PPPs. In this case, it has been shown, through Mecke-Slivnyak theorem [20] and other work,
that the reduced Palm distribution reduces to a PPP which makes it possible to use all the PPP
properties to study a specific point.
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Figure 1.3: The probability density function (pdf) of interference from wireless transmitters
that are distributed according to a PPP of density λ = 5× 10−6. The signal from the wireless
transmitters experiences small scale Rayleigh fading, i.e., exponential channel gain of unit
mean, and large scale pathloss of parameter α = 4. Clearly, the pdf cannot be approximated by
a Gaussian distribution.
As previously mentioned, stochastic geometry has been successfully applied in the field of
wireless communications to study interference. Two main observations are of particular impor-
tance. The first observation is that the interference coming from randomly distributed wireless
transmitters, that experience Rayleigh fading and pathloss, can not be approximated by a Gaus-
sian distribution [18]; as shown in Figure 1.3. The second observation is that interference from
nearby transmitters contribute more than those at a farther distance. This important case gives
rise to what is known as local spectrum opportunities. When a local spectrum opportunity is
available, the interference is said to be below a specific threshold because either the interferers
are located at a further distance from the typical user that is under analysis, or the channel gains
between the interferes and the typical user are low. This allows the typical user to exploit the
RF channel to transmit or receive data. This concept has been used in device-to-device (D2D)
communications as well as cognitive radios.
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1.2 Related Work
The problem of hiding a covert signal in noise to achieve LPD communication is a very well
investigated subject [6], [21], [4]. Spread spectrum techniques, such as frequency hopping
and direct sequence, were initially developed for LPD communications before they found their
way to commercial applications. In the same context, various types of detection methods,
and covert metrics have been developed to detect the covert transmission and determine the
detection performance. Wideband energy detectors, such as channelized radiometers [6], scan
a wide bandwidth for a period of time and measure the collected energy to determine the
presence of covert transmission. In [22], the performance of energy detection is investigated
when different assumptions on the noise variance are made. This work considers a case where
the noise power spectral density is constant but unknown, and another case where the noise
power is fluctuating.
The detectability of cooperative wireless communication networks is addressed in [23],
where two metrics are used to evaluate the LPD performance. The first metric is the distance
ratio between the transmitter and intended receiver and the minimum distance between all the
interceptor and transmitter pairs. The second metric is the ratio between the average distance
between all interceptor and transmitter pairs and the transmitter and intended receiver distance.
On the other hand, the detectability of covert signals using distributed sensors is inves-
tigated in [24]. Here, M intercept receivers try to detect the presence of the covert signal
by taking N samples each and sent to a fusion center for processing. The processing center
performs a GLRT detection on the received samples to make a decision on the presence of a
signal. The performance of the detector was only studied for specific assumed locations for
the intercept receivers, and no work was provided to address the random distribution of the
receivers.
Although the probability of detection and probability of false alarm of an intercept receiver
are widely used to quantify the LPD properties of covert systems, other metrics have also been
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proposed. The authors in [25] analyze the detection of communications signals by an energy
detector and use the ratio of the distance from the transmitter to the radiometer and the intended
receiver as a metric for quantifying the LPD characteristics of the system. Another metric is
proposed in [26] that uses the ratio between the covert signal signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at
the intended receiver, and that at the intercept receiver. This metric takes into account several
parameters such as the propagation loss, and the antenna gain of the covert transmitter, the
covert receiver, and the intercept receiver. Similar to other work, a specific network topology
was assumed in order to analyze the metric instead of deriving the performance for any random
configuration.
Other existing work, such as [27–29] has focused on different aspects of covert commu-
nications in noisy channels. In [27], the theoretical limit of classical LPD methods, such as
spread spectrum, is investigated. The authors main premise is that this theoretical limit has
not been previously investigated; therefore, an information theoretic approach is used to find
the amount of information that can be reliably transmitted over additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channels. In [27], the authors use mutual information between the covert transmitter
and receiver, as well as between the covert transmitter and the eavesdropper in order to demon-
strate that o(
√
n) bits can be exchanged between the covert transmitter and receiver during n
channel uses while lower bounding α+ β ≥ 1− ε ; where α and β are the IR probability of false
alarm and missed detection, and ε is an arbitrary value [27]. The authors mention that their
work can be related to a scenario where the LPD system operates in the presence of a primary
network, in which, some of the users are eavesdroppers; however, they acknowledge that this
is still an open area for research.
The work in [28] provides a conceptual analysis on some fundamental limits on the de-
tectability of covert systems in noisy channels. This paper emphasizes the work done in [27],
and provides a future vision on how to increase the LPD of a wireless covert system through
the introduction of intentional jammers. Those jammers, as they suggested, would act as an
13
additional source of AWGN noise at an IR; however, the analysis in [28] only focused on limits
of covert rate in the presence of channel noise only, and no analysis is presented for the case
where jammers are present. In contrast to [28], this work effort uses the radio transmission
of the users of a primary network as a source of non-Gaussian interference to further hide the
covert signal. Finally, [29] analyzes the detectability of a network of LPD users, and takes the
SNR ratio of the covert signal at the covert receiver and that at the IR as a metric to quantify
the covertness of the system. Due to the complexity of the proposed system model, only a
numerical example is provided to illustrate the achievable covertness.
There are also a few papers that have touched on the subject of introducing artificial noise
in the RF environment increase covertness. For example, in [30], it was shown that by having a
node close to the intercept receiver which transmits artificial noise, a significant improvement
in the throughput of the covert system can be achieved even without a close coordination be-
tween the transmitter and the interfering node. This work also takes into account the presence
of multiple intercept receiver. However, the main drawback of this approach is the very concept
of introducing intentional interferers to mask the covert signal. From an intercept receiver’s
perspective, knowing that noise sources are active could strongly indicate that a covert trans-
mission is already talking place. Additionally, even if this method works for certain scenarios,
it is infeasible for most realistic covert communication cases.
More recently, new covert techniques that exploit existing man-made transmissions have
also been proposed. The authors in [14] provide a method to hide a covert transmission in the
backscatter of radar pulses. In [31] and [32], the backscatter from radar pulses is shown to
increase the interference at the IR with minimum impact on the radar operation as well as the
covert system itself. The metric that was used to quantify covertness is the ratio between the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the intended covert receiver and that at an IR.
Another approach that has been proposed to exploit the transmission of existing networks
for covert communications is introduced in [17], [15], and [33]. The authors in [17] pro-
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pose an Ad-Hoc covert network (ACN) that achieves LPD by accessing the spectrum of an
OFDMA-based primary network (PN), like LTE. Here, the ACN transmits in the guardband of
the RF spectrum of the PN to maintain minimum interference on the PN. At the same time, the
transmission of the PN acts as an interference source at an IR and, consequently, decrease the
detectability of the ACN. In [15], and [33], an analysis is presented on the impact of the ACN
on an OFDM-based PN. The interference from the ACN on the PN bit error rate, frame error
rate, as well as the different layers of the stack protocol is thoroughly analyzed.
1.3 Problem Statement
An examination of the most recent work on covert systems, it can be noticed that there is no
existing work on quantifying neither the covertness nor the achievable throughput of similar
ACNs. The reason for this is related to the difficulty of modeling such a scenario and deriving
a closed-form expressions for corresponding suitable covert metrics [29]. In this work we will
use stochastic geometry to address the questions of the ACN achievable throughput as well as
its covertness.
The contributions in this research effort are summarized as follows:
• Present a spectrum sensing and power allocation algorithm that takes advantage of the
OFDM nature of the PN signal that the ACN is exploiting for covert transmission. This
algorithm takes into account the ACN transmission strategy to achieve covertness.
• Define a metric, namely the aggregate metric, to quantify the covertness of the ACN
from the perspective of the IR. Then use stochastic geometry to derive a closed-form
expression for this metric.
• Define a metric, namely the ratio metric, that quantifies the performance from the per-
spective of each ACN link. Using stochastic geometry, we derive a lower bound for this
metric to take into account a worst case scenario from the perspective of the ACN.
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• Provide an in-depth analysis of the ACN performance in terms of covertness and achiev-
able throughput, and present a detailed description on how to design the ACN and select
its main parameters.
• Develop a framework to analyze the trade-off between throughput and covertness for the
ACN.
1.4 System Model
The system model is comprised of an OFDM-based primary network (PN) of multiple base
stations and multiple mobile users, an Ad-Hoc covert network (ACN) that opportunistically
exploits the RF spectrum of the PN to achieve LPD, and an intercept receiver that searches for
the presence of the ACN by scanning the RF spectrum of the PN. An illustrative example of
the system model is provided in Figure 1.4.
1.4.1 Wireless Primary Network
The PN is assumed to be a mobile wireless network with a number of base stations and a
number of primary users that connect to the base stations on the PN uplink channel. The lo-
cation distribution of the base stations is assumed to be a homogeneous Poisson point process
(PPP) [18], ΦB = {z j ∈ R2; j = 1,2, ...}, of intensity λB. The network spectrum is divided into
a number of frequency resources, which we will refer to as Resource Blocks (RBs), and those
resources are assigned to the PN users in a slotted manner for T seconds. The PN users be-
longing to the same base station communicate with their serving base station using orthogonal
resources. The location distribution of the PN users is assumed to follow an independent PPP,
ΦP = {xi ∈ R2; i = 1,2, ...}, of intensity λP. We assume the PN users have a minimum and max-
imum transmission power, denoted as Pmin, and Pmax, respectively, and connect to their nearest
base station, i.e., to the base station of the smallest pathloss. Unless the minimum or the max-
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Figure 1.4: The figure shows a realization of a PPP of the distribution of the PN base stations
and their Voronoi cells. It also shows a realization of the PPP of the ACN transmitters. The IR
is randomly located in R2, and tries to detect if any covert activity is taking place.
imum transmission power is exceeded, each PU transmits at a power level that compensates
for its pathloss to its serving base station and tries to achieve a target received power of Pt.
Finally, due to channel variations and the scheduling algorithm of the PN, we assume that any
PN base station’s RB could be left unoccupied with a probability of 1− ρ could be occupied
with a probability of ρ. Therefore, ρ = 0 means that all the PN RBs are always empty, which
is equivalent to saying that there is no PN.
1.4.2 Ad-Hoc Covert Network
The ACN is a covert network of a number of Ad-Hoc transmitters that exploit the uplink
channel of the PN in order to hide their transmission. We assume the distribution of the ACN
users follows a homogeneous PPP, ΦC = {yk ∈ R2; k = 1,2, ...} of intensity λC << λP, and each
ACN user senses the RBs of the PN and decides to transmit at power Pc only when it finds
17
an empty RBs; the ACN users could be communicating with each other or with a central unit
located at the origin o ∈ R2; any discussion on MAC protocols is beyond the scope of this paper
and is left for future work.
It is known that sensing is not accurate and depends on the chosen receiver operating char-
acteristic (ROC) point; therefore, an ACN user will occasionally incorrectly transmit in a PN
RB that is actually occupied by a PN user, which will cause interference on/from the PN users
belonging to all the base stations that happened to be occupying the same RB; those PN users
are represented by Φδ ⊂ ΦP. We denote the probability of this event, i.e., sensing a RB is
empty although it is occupied by a PN user, as πe = (1−Pd)ρ; where Pd is the ACN probability
of sensing a PN resource as occupied. We also denote the probability that the ACN correctly
senses and transmits in a PN frequency resource as πs = (1−Pfa)(1− ρ); where Pfa is the proba-
bility of false alarm of the ACN sensing method. It is important to keep in mind that πs+πe , 1
because we need to take into account that the ACN refrains from transmitting if it does not find
empty PN RBs.
1.4.3 Intercept Receiver
The IR is located at v ∈R2, and aims at detecting the presence of ACN transmission. However,
because of the random behavior of the PN and the random position of the ACN users, IR
cannot know a priori the frequency resources that the ACN plans to use, nor its transmission
strategy, and therefore, we focus on the case where the IR must monitor the entire PN spectrum;
extending this work to other cases is straight forward.
1.4.4 Channel Model
The channel between any transmitter and any receiver is subject to both small scale Rayleigh
fading, i.e., exponential channel gain distribution of unit parameter, as well as large scale
pathloss of pathloss exponent α > 2. We denote the channel gain between the kth ACN user
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and the IR as gvk . We also donate the channel between the ith PU and the IR as g1i, and
between the ith PN user and the ACN receiver as g0i.
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Chapter 2
Exploiting the Spectrum of
Primary Wireless Networks
2.1 Key Points of the Chapter
In this chapter, we discuss how an ACN user accesses the spectrum of the PN. In concept, the
ACN user can either blindly transmit in the RF band of the PN or use sensing to determine
which frequency resources are available at the time of its transmission. The former option
introduces significant interference on/from the PN because the ACN user will very often trans-
mit in PN resources that are being used by PN users. The later option is more suitable for the
operation of the ACN because the ACN user needs to sense the PN resources and transmit only
in those that will be found as empty. In this case the interference on the PN will be reduced.
2.2 Introduction
To address the question of the ACN achievable throughput, an ACN user is assumed to per-
form spectrum sensing to find potentially PN empty frequency resources. Then the ACN user
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will transmit in a subset of the empty resources at a certain power so that it maximizes its
throughput and minimizes its interference on the PN. For this purpose, an ACN spectrum sens-
ing and power allocation algorithm that takes advantage of the OFDM nature of the PN will be
presented.
Spectrum sensing is a topic that has been very well investigated in the context of cognitive
radios [34]. This available work mostly considers sensing a PN of a single or multiple bands
where each band is occupied by a single PN transmitter. Those transmitters are assumed to
transmit at a constant power for a long transmission period, which allows a cognitive radio to
easily filter the PN signal and perform spectrum sensing in the time domain. However, because
of the nature of the OFDM signal where the subcarriers have relatively narrow bandwidth, and
different subcarriers are occupied by users that are transmitting at different power levels, time
domain sensing of multiple subcarriers in a relatively short period of time is inefficient and
computationally expensive. Also no work has been done on sensing the spectrum of PNs of
multiple users and base stations. Therefore, for the covert communications model at hand, it
is more practical to take advantage of the OFDM nature of the PN signal, where symbols are
mapped onto orthogonal subcarriers, to perform sensing in the frequency domain.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.3 discusses how sensing
in the frequency domain is more practical to determine which PN resources are empty. This
section also discusses the three possible options to choose the ACN user sensing threshold. In
Section 2.4, the performance of the sensing stage is discussed.
2.3 Spectrum Exploitation
If the ACN blindly transmits in the RF spectrum of the PN, excessive interference would be
incurred on/from the PN. Therefore, an ACN that needs to operate in the RF band of a PN must
choose suitable resource blocks for transmission. Since the ACN needs to stay covert as well
as Ad-Hoc, no information on the empty RBs would be exchanged between the PN and the
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ACN; therefore, the ACN users must perform spectrum sensing and transmit at a power level
that guarantees minimum interference and detection.
As illustrated in Fig. 2.1, the PN resource grid is divided into resource blocks and each
resource block is divided into P subcarriers in the frequency domain and multiple OFDM
symbols in the time domain. We can take advantage of the subcarriers in a resource block for
sensing if the sensing time, τ, is made equal to the duration of one, or an integer multiple of one,
OFDM symbol. Lets assume the ACN user senses the PN spectrum by collecting L samples
for the duration of one OFDM symbol, then using L-point discrete Fourier transform on the
time-domain PN received signal, the vector of the PN received symbols, Y, in the frequency
domain is given as:
H0 : Y =W z = Z,






where small letter and capital letter symbols represent vectors of samples in the time and
frequency domains, respectively. W is the L × L DFT matrix, and z is an L × 1 vector of
i.i.d. circularly symmetric complex Gaussian noise samples of known variance CN(0,σ2),
with real and imaginary parts of N(0,σ2/2). φP is the realization of the point process ΦP of
the PN users who exist during the ACN sensing period, and |φP | is its cardinality. si is an L×1
vector representing the received OFDM signal of the ith PN user. When DFT is performed
on the received time-domain PN signal, the result is a vector of either noise Z or noise and
PN symbols S. It is known that only the PN users belonging to the same base station are
scheduled on different RBs; therefore, any element Sl of the vector S will be the summation of
the received symbols from all the PN users xi ∈ φP that belong to different PN base stations and
happen to occupy the same OFDM subcarrier. That is Sl =
∑|φδ,l |
k=1 Sl,k , where φδ,l is the point


























Figure 2.1: An illustration of one PN resource block (RB). The RB contains P subcarriers in
the frequency domain and a number of OFDM symbols in the time domain.
Any PN user occupies P adjacent subcarriers that are grouped in a RB; therefore, an ACN
user can use all the subcarriers in a RB for sensing. In this case, we can define the test statistic




Ylσ 2 . (2.2)
The ACN receiver compares this test statistic to a threshold ηs and determines whether
the corresponding RB is occupied. All the available RBs, i.e., found as unoccupied, will then
define a set A = {n : Vn ≤ ηs, n = 0, ...,N −1} of RBs that can be used for transmission by the
ACN network. The test statistics under analysis can now be formulated as a binary hypothesis
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testing problem for each RB:




H1 : Vn =
P(n+1)∑
l=nP+1
Sl + Zlσ 2 ,
(2.3)
where Sl is the PN received symbol on the lth subcarrier. We notice that |Zl/σ | has a Rayleigh
distribution with parameter σ = 1, while |(Sl + Zl)/σ | has a Rice distribution [35] with scale
parameter σ = 1 and noncentrality parameter of |Sl/σ |. Under H0, the test statistic Vn has a
Gamma distribution [36] with shape parameter P and scale parameter of 2, that is:
f (Vn | H0) ∼ Γ(P,2), (2.4)
Under the alternative hypothesis H1, the test statistic is the sum of P Rice squared ran-
dom variables which results in a non-central chi-squared distribution [36] with 2P degrees of
freedom and noncentrality parameter λn, that is:
f (Vn | H1) ∼ χ22P(λn), (2.5)
Using the P available subcarriers in each RB, the non-centrality parameter can be written











⇒ λn = Pθn
(2.6)
The probability of false alarm, and the probability of correct sensing [36], at a target PN
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f (Vn | H0) dVn = 1−FVn |H0(ηs)











where γ(., .) is the lower incomplete Gamma function, and Q.(., .) is the Marcum Q-function
[37]. It should be noted that P(n)d in (8) is for a specific realization of φp, i.e., specific PN SNR
θn. Therefore, the average probability of correct sensing on the nth RB is found by averaging








ηs) f (θn)dθn (2.9)
The integration in (2.9) cannot be expressed as a closed-form expression. The detection
threshold can be set using the expression in (2.7), or the expression in (2.8) if a target θn is
required, or even using the expression in (2.9) if an average probability of sensing is needed.
In the rest of this paper, the value of the false alarm probability is used to set up the sensing
threshold ηs to find the empty RBs. Choosing a high value for the false alarm probability will
reduce the total throughput of the ACN, while choosing a small value for P(n)f a will increase the
interference on the PN. In order to extend the analysis to the case where k OFDM symbols are
used for sensing, then the number of subcarriers per PN RB should be replaced by kP.
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2.4 Exploitation Performance
In this section we first analyze the performance of the ACN frequency-domain sensing method.
As discussed in the system model, the PN has a number of base stations and a number of
users. The PN base stations and users are assumed to be distributed as a PPP of intensity
λB = 10−5 BS/m2, λP = 5×10−5 PU/m2, respectively. The PN spectrum is assumed to have a
total bandwidth of 20MHz and is divided into sub-channels each of bandwidth 180KHz. Time
is divided into slots of duration 10ms. Following the LTE standards [38], the PN user’s mini-
mum and maximum transmission power are chosen to be Pmin = −40dBm and Pmax = 24dBm,
respectively. The ACN hides its transmission in the RF spectrum of the PN by choosing a sub-
channel and a time slot for transmission. The sensing time and detection threshold are chosen
so that Pfa = 0.1; this value will always be used unless otherwise specified.
Each RB is composed of P = 12 OFDM subcarriers in the frequency domain and seven
OFDM symbols in the time domain. The time duration of the RBs is 0.5ms. In OFDM-based
systems like LTE [38], each PN user is assigned 540KHz for the duration of 1ms, i.e., a total of
six RBs at each transmission cycle; however, the first three OFDM symbols cannot be used by
the ACN for spectrum sensing as they are dedicated for transmitting PN control information.
This leaves us with a total of K = 11 symbols for ACN sensing and transmission.
Now we can analyze the performance of the ACN sensing method. Figure 2.2 shows the
performance of the proposed method when sensing is performed using one OFDM symbol out
of the eleven available. We notice that the sensing method has a high performance even for
low PN SNR values at the ACN. This property of the sensing method, i.e., high probability
of detection at a low PN SNR value, is very important because it allows the ACN to find the
empty RBs more accurately which reduces the interference on the PN.
Figure 2.3 shows the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of detecting
N unoccupied RBs when only one OFDM symbol is used for sensing. The figure shows
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Figure 2.2: The probability of false alarm as a function of the ACN sensing threshold.
























Figure 2.3: The complimentary distribution function of the number of PN RBs that can be
found empty by the ACN and can be used for covert transmission. The curve related to the
channel model provided by LTE standards is close to the curve of α = 4.
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alarm is set at 10−3. Figure 2.3 shows the probability of available RBs when the ACN-RX
is randomly located at a spatial location in the coverage area of the PN. Clearly, as the value
of the pathloss exponent, α, increases, the number of RBs that are sensed as available by the
ACN increases as well. This is because the amount of energy received from the PN users at the
ACN becomes lower due to higher pathloss. In this figure, we use for comparison the channel
pathloss model that is used in the LTE standards [18]. We notice that the corresponding CCDF
curve is very close to the curve where α = 4; which is the value we used throughout this paper





Performance of the ACN
3.1 Key Points of the Chapter
In this chapter, we use stochastic geometry to develope and provide a comprehensive analysis
for two metrics. The aggregate metric is used to quantify the covertness of the ACN from the
perspective of the IR, while the ratio metric quantifies the covertness and performance from the
perspective of the ACN users. The metrics are used to determine the detectability limits of the
ACN by an IR, and the advantages of using interference, instead of noise, to increase covert-
ness will be demonstrated. The performance of the ratio metric will be discussed under three
different cases: noise-limited, interference-limited with perfect sensing of the environment,
and interference-limited with imperfect sensing.
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3.2 Introduction
To address the question of covertness of a network of Ad-Hoc users, we define and analyze two
metrics that quantifies the covertness of the ACN from two different perspectives: the ACN,
and the IR perspectives. In this context, we notice that regardless of the specific characteristics
of the PN, and the detection method being used by an IR, a low SINR for the covert signal at
the IR is a main factor in limiting the performance of the IR. Therefore, a question in the design
of an ACN is how low the ACN SINR can be maintained at a desired distance for a given covert
configuration and operating requirements. Two perspectives need to be considered in regards
to the covertness of an ACN of multiple users. From the perspective of the IR, determining
whether an ACN is active or a covert transmission is taking place is needed before attempting
to localize the ACN transmitter; therefore, it can be said that covertness is achieved if the
aggregate SINR, from all the ACN users exploiting a certain RF band, remains below some
threshold. From the perspective of the ACN, the goal is to know whether each transmitter can
achieve a target SINR at its intended receiver while maintaining a lower SINR at an IR that
could be located at some distance away from the ACN transmitter. This discussion shows that
the SINR from the collective ACN users is a suitable metric to quantify covertness at an IR;
here, we define this metric as the aggregate metric. On the other hand, the ratio of ACN SINR
at the intended ACN receiver to that at an IR is a useful metric to quantify covertness from the
perspective of individual ACN users; we define this metric as the ratio metric. In this paper, we
derive a closed-form formula for the aggregate metric and a lower bound on the ratio metric.
3.3 Covertness of a Network of Covert Users
As illustrated in Fig. 3.1, the first step for an IR is to determine if a covert transmission
is taking place. Next it can try to localize one of the transmitters. The probability that the
IR detect the ACN depends on various factors such as the detection method being used, the
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detection threshold, the time-bandwidth product of the IR, and the ACN SINR at the IR. Of
these parameters, the ACN can can try to control its SINR to remain covert. In this sense, the
communication of the ACN is considered covert if the IR fails to detect its presence with a
certain probability, i.e., Pdet ≤ η1, which is equivalent to saying that the aggregate SINR of the
ACN users remains below a certain threshold with a certain probability, i.e., P[SINRR ≤ η].
Since interference from the PN users is dominant in the RF environment, noise can be ignored.
The aggregate metric is defined here as follows:
GA =
∑
yk∈Φc Pc gvk r
−α
vk∑




where Pc is each ACN user’s total transmitted power, rvk = | |yk − v | | and rvi = | |xi − v | | are
the distance between the kth ACN user and the IR and between the ith PN user and the IR,
respectively. This metric represents the total received power from all the ACN users to the
total interference from all the PN users falling in the time-bandwidth product of the IR. Note
that the lower the value of this metric, the better the covertness of the ACN. In fact, this metric
is a random variable due to the variations in channel gains and the randomness in the location
of both the ACN transmitters and the PN users. The following theorem finds the probability of
this metric being less than an SINR threshold η.
The following corollary will prove helpful in the derivation of the CDF of the aggregate
metric.
Corollary I: The expected value of a typical PN user’s transmitted power, given the trans-











































Figure 3.1: The first step for an IR is to determine if covert transmission is taking place. Next
it can try to localize one of its transmitters.
Proof: The expected value of the PN transmitted power, given the transmission policy for




















































The variables β1 and β2 are given in (3.3). 
Now Corollary I can be used to derive the CDF of the aggregate metric as presented in the
next theorem.
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Theorem II: The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the aggregate covert metric is
given by:

























M = 1.57πρλC. (3.7)
Proof: The direct approach to prove the theorem is to first find the pdf of the interference
at the IR and the pdf of the aggregate ACN received power. Following the general approach of



















































































In (a), the summation is taken outside the exponential function and became a multiplication.
(b) is obtained by applying the probability generating functional (PGFL) [20], and Λ(.) is the
measurable function [19]. In (c), the location x is represented in polar coordinates. In (d), the
expected value of the channel gain [19] is: E[g2/α1 ] = Γ(1+
2
α ), and the expected value of the
transmitted power is derived in Corollary I.
Now, the pdf of I can be found by taking the inverse Laplace transform [39] of the final









where the parameter K is given in (3.6). Similarly, the aggregate ACN received power will
have the same pdf if we replace the pdf parameter K with M that is given in (3.7); where in this
case E[P2/α] =
√







yk∈Φc Pc gvk r
−α
vk∑




































where (a) is the definition of probability in terms of expected value over the indicator function
1{.} of the eventsA = {SINRR ≤ η}. (b) is just a rearrangement of the terms and conditioning
on the value of the interference. In (c), the CDF of the ACN aggregate received power is













Figure 3.2: The ACN transmitter needs to achieve high throughput, i.e, high SINR, at the ACN
receiver, but also minimize its SINR at an IR. In this case there will be a trade-off between the
ACN throughput and its covertness.
3.4 Performance of a Single Covert Link
From the perspective of the ACN, covertness for individual users is crucial. As shown in
Fig. 3.2, any ACN transmitter needs to achieve a high SINR at its intended receiver while
still minimizing its SINR at the IR. In other words, the SINR at an IR, SINRR, located at some
distance, rv, from an ACN transmitter should be sufficiently lower than the SINR at an intended
covert receiver, i.e., SINRC, that is located at a distance ry. This case raises a trade-off between
the ACN possible throughput and its covertness; therefore, we can define the ratio metric as
the ratio of SINRC to SINRR.
For this metric, the covert signal received by the ACN receiver will be corrupted by both
noise and interference with a probability πe (erroneous transmission) or noise only with prob-
ability of πs if there are no nearby local interferes. Assume the ACN transmission bandwidth
is Bc, and the IR detection bandwidth is Br = κ Bc. Let the noise be i.i.d., zero-mean AWGN of
power spectral density N0 W/Hz, then the noise power at the ACN and IR receivers become,











Pj g0 j r−αj
, (3.11)
where ry = | |y | |, and r j = | |x j | | are the distances of the ACN transmitter and the jth PU to the
ACN receiver (which is located at the origin), respectively.
On the other hand, the IR does not know the frequency or the transmission strategy of the
ACN; therefore, the SINR of the covert signal at the IR will always be corrupted by interference
of all the PUs in the network as well as the noise. Hence, the instantaneous SINR at the IR,
SINRR, is given as:







where rv = | |y−v| |, and ri = | |xi −v| | are the distances of the ACN transmitter, and the ith PN






















Pj g0 j r−αj and I1 =
∑
xi∈ΦP
Pi g1i r−αi . From the perspective of the ACN, the
larger this metric, the higher the covertness of each ACN user. Note that this metric is also a
random variable due to variations in parameters such as channel gains, the location of the PN
users. Therefore, a suitable way to characterize the system covert performance is to analyze
the complimentary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of the metric, i.e., P[GR > µ].
Also note that GR does not depend on the transmission power of the ACN. This is because
we are analyzing the probability that the SINR at the ACN receiver being greater than the
SINR at the IR by a factor of µ; regardless of the transmission power of the ACN. In this case,
if the ACN choses to transmit at a power level Pc to achieve a target SINRC, then the metric
guarantees that the covert SINR at the IR, i.e., SINRR, will be smaller by a factor of µ with a
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probability of P[GR > µ]. A lower bound on the CCDF of the ratio metric GR is presented in
the theorem below.
Theorem III: For an ACN user with imperfect sensing, the CCDF of GR has a lower bound
given by:





























































Proof: The CCDF of GR has the lower bound that is given in:




















The terms I1, and I0 are dependent because Φδ ⊂ ΦP. Consequently, we can think of the
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interference measured at the IR, i.e., I1, as comprised of two terms: the first term, I10, which
represents the interference from the PUs that also interfere with the ACN when it mistakenly
transmit in the same RF resources. The second term, I11, represents the rest of the interferers
which falls in the detection bandwidth of the IR. I10 can be ignored in comparison with I11
because the ACN achieves covertness by transmitting in a small percentage of the PN spectrum.
With this assumption, I0 and I1 can be assumed independent without making any significant
compromises. Therefore:















]  . (3.17)
The outer and inner expectations are with respect to the terms of I0 and I1, respectively.
Following the approach presented in Appendix C, the pdf of I0 and I1 can be easily found to
be similar to (3.9) with parameters K1 and K2 given in (3.15), respectively; which are given in








































1+2ε−2(1−(1−2/π) exp(−ε f (ε)))
(3.18)
where f (ε), ε, and γt are all given in (3.15). The expression in (a) multiplies a very large num-
ber, i.e., the exponential term, by a very small number, i.e., the complimentary error function.
This might lead to inaccurate answers when evaluated in digital systems. Therefore, we use the
alternative expression in (b) which has been shown to be a good approximation [40]. Finally,
we can calculate the outer expectation in (3.17) using the pdf of I0 and then simplify the result
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to prove the theorem. 
This theorem provides valuable insights for several special cases. The first special case
is when we assume there is no interference. In the absence of interference, noise becomes
the main factor in achieving covertness in the noise-limited regime (NL). Therefore, this case
represents the classical approach of hiding signals in noise, such as spread spectrum. By
ignoring the interference terms in (3.13), the covert metric for a NL regime is calculated as
follows:






It can be noticed that the result in (3.19) reinforces the idea that the covertness of an ACS
system is directly related to both its processing gain w.r.t. to the IR, and its relative distance
to the IR. Later, we will use this case as a benchmark to see if hiding the ACN signal the RF
spectrum provides any additional covertness.
The second special case is when we set πe = 0. This is equivalent to saying that the
ACN does not make any sensing mistakes and perfectly accesses the spectrum of the PN,
i.e., interference-limited perfect sensing (ILPS); this could be possible if the ACN has prior
knowledge about the local availability of certain PN RBs. In this case, (3.14) is reduced to the
following expression:




It can be noticed that this represent the first term in (3.14), which makes the remaining term
equivalent to covertness loss due to the imperfect sensing and exploitation of the PN spectrum.
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3.5 Performance Analysis
In this section, we validate the derived expressions for both the aggregate and ratio metrics.
The PN has a number of base stations and a number of users. The PN base stations and users
are assumed to be distributed as a PPP of intensity λB = 10−5 BS/m2. Following the LTE
standards [38], the PN user’s minimum and maximum transmission power are chosen to be
Pmin = −40dBm and Pmax = 24dBm, respectively. The ACN hides its transmission in the RF
spectrum of the PN by choosing a sub-channel and a time slot for transmission. The ACN uses
the frequency-domain sensing method, that was previously discussed, to sense the PN spectrum
for empty resources; the sensing time and detection threshold are chosen so that Pfa = 0.1; this
value will always be used unless otherwise specified.
Fig. 3.3 shows the CDF of the aggregate metric for different λC values. The simulated
curves were obtained by running 50,000 iterations and averaging over the random locations of
both the PN and ACN users. It can be noticed that the simulation results match the theoretical
prediction. By looking at individual curves, it can be observed that when the value of λC
is small in comparison with the given value of λP, i.e., low number of ACN users, the CDF
curve of the metric rapidly approaches 1, even for low SINR values, η. Since these curves
represent the aggregate ACN SINR values when averaged over the locations of the ACN users,
it can be said that on average the SINR of the ACN is guaranteed to remain low, and a covert
communication is possible. Moreover, when we compare different CDF curves of the metric,
we notice that the covertness of the ACN, i.e., the probability that the ACN maintains a specific
value for η, rapidly decreases as the intensity (the number) of the ACN users increases. So, for
example, we can choose η = 10 and notice that P[GA ≤ η] decreases by 20%, i.e., from 0.98
to 0.79, when the intensity of the ACN users increases ten folds from λC = 10−7 to λC = 10−6;
however, P[GA ≤ η] decreases by almost 50%, i.e., from 0.79 to 0.4 when λC only increases
four folds from 10−6 to 4×10−6.
In Fig. 3.4, we choose η = 1 and graph the maximum intensity of the ACN transmitters
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Figure 3.3: The complimentary distribution function for the aggregate metric GA for λP =
15×10−5.
that can maintain a desired P[GA ≤ 1]. Each curve shows that the ACN intensity must be
decreased if the ACN is to be designed to achieve a higher GA CDF value. On the other
hand, the different curves in Fig. 3.4 demonstrate that it is possible for more ACN transmitters
to operate in the same region and maintain the same P[GA ≤ η] if the intensity of the PN
users increases. This result should in fact be expected because as the number of the PN users
increases in the operation area of the ACN, the ability of the IR to detect the presence of the
covert transmission decreases.
To validate the derived expression of the ratio metric, we can assume a case where an ACN
user is equally located from both the ACN receiver and the IR, i.e., ry = rv = 100. In Fig. 3.5,
we graph the simulated and theoretical curves of the ratio metric for three scenarios: noise-
limited (NL), interference-limited with perfect sensing (ILPS) πe = 0, and interference-limited
with imperfect sensing (ILIS)πe = 1. Here, the case πe = 0 means that the ACN perfectly
senses and accesses the PN spectrum without any errors. Therefore, the ACN will to be able
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Figure 3.4: The maximum ACN transmitter density as a function of the CDF of GA, for η = 1.
The different curves represent different intensity values for the PN users.
to operate with minimum transmission power and achieve the highest covertness because it
will experience the lowest interference from the PN. On the other hand, the noise-only curve
represents the case where there is no PN that the ACN can exploit to increase covertness. This
case is equivalent to the traditional scenario of hiding signals in noise; therefore, it can be
considered as the worst case scenario for hiding the ACN signal. It is clear from Fig. 3.5 that
the ACN achieves higher covertness if it hides its signal in the radio transmissions of another
network rather than in noise only, and this covertness increases as the ACN sensing accuracy of
the PN RBs increases. For example, in πe = 0 case, the figure shows that with 95% probability,
the SINR of the covert signal at the ACN receiver will be µ = 20 times greater than at the IR.
In comparison, for the πe = 1 case, the ACN SINR has only 56% probability to be 20 times
higher at the ACN receiver than at the IR, and only 32% for the noise-only case. This means
that if the ACN must achieve a target SINR of (10dB) at its receiver, then it is guaranteed with
95% probability that the covert SINR at the IR is at or below (-10dB) for πe = 0 case.
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Figure 3.5: The complimentary distribution function of the ratio metric GR for λp = 15×10−5.
The blue and black curves represent the upper and lower bounds on the performance of the
ACN in the presence of a PN, while the red curve at the bottom represents the covertness of
the ACN in the absence of a PN.
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Analytical ILIS, ρ = 0.5
Analytical ILIS, ρ = 1
Analytical NL
Figure 3.6: The CCDF of the ratio metric when the distance between the ACN transmitter
and the IR is increased relative to the ACN transmitter-receiver distance. The ACN covertness
rapidly increases as the ratio increases; µ = 15.
In Fig. 3.6, we set η = 15, and graph the theoretical curves for the covert metric when
we increase the distance of the IR with respect to the ACN transmitter. It is shown that the
covertness of the ACN increases as the distance between the IR and the ACN increases. It can
also be noticed that the covertness rapidly increases for the NL case as well as for high PN
load.
Finally, Fig. 3.7 shows the theoretical curves of the CCDF of the covert metric as a function
of the PU density λP as well as the network load ρ; for µ = 15. When the density decreases to
zero, the metric value converges to the NL scenario. As the density increases, the CCDF of the
metric increases and seems to converge to an upper value that depends on system parameters.
On the other hand, the CCDF of the covert metric increases as the PN traffic load increases
before decreasing. This behavior occurs because for low and moderate PN load, the ACN can
still find unoccupied PN resources for transmission which increases its covertness; however, as
the PN load continues to increase and reaches full capacity, the ACN starts to transmit more in
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Figure 3.7: The figure shows the CCDF of the covert metric as a function of the PU density
(top) and the PN load (bottom); µ = 15.
resources occupied by the PN than in empty resources which decreases its corresponding SINR
and, consequently, decreases the ability to maintain covertness. Figure 3.6 clearly demonstrates
that the ACN can perform better when the PN has empty resources, i.e., the PN is not fully
loaded.





Tradeoff and System Design
4.1 Key Points of the Chapter
In this chapter, we discuss the case where the ACN user exploit multiple PN resources. In this
case there would be a trade-off between the ACN achievable throughput and its covertness.
This chapter we also discuss some of the factors that affect the design of the ACN, and also
present design case. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describe how the ACN
user can exploit multiple PN resources to achieve higher throughput. Section 4.3 discusses
important covertness characteristics and design aspects for the ACN.
4.2 Introduction
A comprehensive analysis of the ACN performance is presented in this chapter. The derivation
of the two covert metrics assumes that the ACN user senses the PN spectrum and transmit in an
empty PN resource. However, allowing the ACN user to transmit in multiple resources could
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increase its throughput, but might decrease its covertness as well. Therefore, there is a trade-off
between the ACN achievable throughput and its covertness. One of the questions that needs
to be addressed is whether the ACN should use all the PN resources it finds for transmission
or just choose a subset. Another question is how to allocate power to the empty PN resources.
Another important question is whether the aggregate metric and the ratio metrics can be used to
answer key design and system tradeoff factors that would affect the performance of the ACN.
These questions will be answered in the following sections. To be specific, we look at how
the ACN will allocate its power to the available PN resources. Also we discuss how the PN
configuration affects the achievable throughput of the ACN. We also use our analysis of the two
metrics to design the ACN and draw conclusions on its expected performance. This chapter
can be considered as the first work to provide the first comprehensive analysis of an Ad-Hoc
covert system that exploits the RF spectrum of a PN, and would open the door for future work
on this subject.
4.3 Covertness-Throughput Tradeoff Analysis
When spectrum sensing is complete using the algorithm previously discussed, the ACN chooses
to exploit all or a limited number of the PN RBs in the set A. For a certain level of required
covertness, the ACN user can occupy either part or the whole RB bandwidth. Therefore, the
instantaneous throughput the ACN can achieve when a RB is found available, given it was
actually available, is given by:







where Pc,n is the ACN power allocated to the nth RB, σ2 is the noise power, gc,n is the channel
gain between the ACN transmitter and receiver, and ρs ∈ [0,1] is the percentage of the available
RB bandwidth that will be occupied by the ACN, and its value affect the value of κ in the ratio
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and aggregate metrics. Since noise and channel fading are present, spectrum sensing becomes
imperfect, and a false alarm can occur. In such a case, the ACN will mistakenly transmit in an
unoccupied RB unaware of the presence of the PN signal. The achievable capacity in this case
becomes:




Pi g0i r−α0i +σ
2
ª®®¬, (4.2)
where Pi is the transmission power of the ith PN user that is in the transmitting in the nth
RB, g0i is the channel gain between the ith PN user and the ACN receive, and ri = | |xi | | is
the distance of the ith PU and the ACN receiver. On the other hand, if the ACN detects the
presence of the PN, it will not transmit on that RB; this includes the case of detecting the PN
when in fact it is not present. The achievable throughput of the ACN network over all available












In order to maximize its throughput, the ACN transmitter has to allocate a total power of Pc
to the available RBs, and, at the same time, must protect the PN from undesired interference.
These two constraints on the ACN network can be described respectively as:
∑
n∈A
Pc,n ≤ Pc, (4.4)
∑
n∈A
gcp,n Pc,n r−αcp ≤ Imax, (4.5)
where gcp,n and rcp are the channel gain and distance between the ACN transmitter and PN
receiver, respectively. Therefore, the ACN must solve the following optimization problem at





s.t. (4.4), (4.5),Pc,n ≥ 0,0 ≤ τ ≤ T
The objective of this optimization problem is to find an optimum transmission power in
each RB, as well as the optimum sensing time that maximizes the total ACN throughput. This
optimization problem is not convex; Therefore, we will first fix the sensing time and solve the
power allocation sub-problem for the chosen RBs. Later we will show that there is no need
to optimize the sensing time if the previously discussed frequency domain spectrum sensing is
used. In addition, the ACN can set up its maximum transmission power based on the maximum
allowed interference and the average estimated channel gain over all the available RBs [41].
Since the ACN is trying to maintain a low probability of detection by transmitting at lower
power and using frequency hopping, the condition in (4.5) can be neglected as long as (4.4) in
maintained.





















The following theorem solves the previous optimization problem and provides the trans-
mission power needed for each available PN resources.
Theorem I: For the optimization problem in Prob. 1, the ACN optimal power allocation
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Pi g0i r−α0i , (4.8)




= max(P∗c,n,0) is used to
guarantee a positive transmission power value for every RB.












































) ] +λ = 0, (4.10)








. The following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) con-
ditions [42] must hold for the optimal solution:
∑
n∈A





λ∗ = 0, (4.12)
λ∗ ≥ 0. (4.13)
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Examining the KKT condition in (4.12) shows that either λ∗ = 0, or
∑
n∈A P∗c,n = Pc. How-
ever, if λ∗ = 0, then (4.10) implies that P∗c,n ≤ 0, which is invalid; therefore,
∑
n∈A P∗c,n = Pc,
i.e., replace the inequality sign in (4.11) with equality. We know that, for a given detection
threshold, the ACN falsely decides that a RB is available if either the channel gain to the PN
is low, or the noise power is high, i.e., low PN SNR. Therefore, the gradient of the Lagrange
Multiplier in (4.10) can be shown to equal:
Pc,n ≈






Substituting in (4.12), the optimal value of the constant λ is:
λ∗ =









which clearly satisfies (4.13). The optimal power allocated to each available RB can now be
calculated as in (4.7). 
An important observation is that the power allocation in (4.7) does not depend on the pro-
cessing gain of the ACN which means the power allocation is independent of the waveform of
the ACN.
As previously discussed, the duration of one OFDM symbol, i.e., the minimum possible
time, is used for spectrum sensing in order to simplify the optimization problem Prob1. Now
we can show that the optimum sensing time that yields the highest throughput is achieved
when only one OFDM symbol is used for sensing. Equations (2.7) and (2,8) allow the sensing
time to be an integer multiple of the duration of one OFDM symbol, i.e., replacing P by kP.
For this purpose, we assume that the PN base stations are distributed as a PPP of intensity
λB = 10−5 BS/m2. Following the LTE standards [38], the PN user’s minimum and maximum
transmission power are chosen to be Pmin = −40dBm and Pmax = 24dBm, respectively. The
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Figure 4.1: Average ACN throughput versus the number of OFDM symbols used for spectrum
sensing. The figure shows the throughput for two different PN user densities. It can be noticed
that the throughput decreases as the number of symbols used for sensing increases.
ACN sensing threshold is chosen so that Pfa = 0.1.
In Figure 4.1, we graph the ACN average information theoretic throughput, scaled by the
PN bandwidth, as a function of the number of OFDM symbols used for sensing. Each curve
represents a different density of PN users, and the power allocation algorithm is used without
any consideration to the ACN covertness. The figure shows that the ACN capacity decreases
when more OFDM symbols are used for spectrum sensing; therefore, for a covert system that
has a limited time for sensing and transmitting, our assumption in Prob2, that the optimization
of the sensing time equals to one OFDM symbol is valid. It should be noted that in practical
systems, additional time is needed for synchronizing the ACN receiver to the ACN transmit-
ter and for other hardware limitations; therefore, the scaled information theoretic throughput,
C/B, is the ideal limit which only provides a reference for initial system designs and illustrates
how much room there is for improvement.
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At this stage, it is possible to use the power allocation expression along with CCDF of the
ratio metric to provide a system level tradeoff between the ACN achievable throughput and
expected covertness. However, in order to derive a closed-form expression for the ratio metric
in (3.14), we made an assumption that the ACN must only transmit in a small percentage of the
PN RBs; without clearly defining what a small percentage is. On the other hand the spectrum
access algorithm could allow the ACN user to access a large number of PN RBs. In this case,
the accuracy of the expression of the ratio metric could be compromised. Therefore, it is very
important to find out the maximum number of PN RBs that the ACN can exploit before the
derived expression of the ratio metric is no longer accurate. Once this value is determined, the
ACN user must not use for its transmission more PN RBs than that value.
In order to address this point, we compare our derived expression of the ratio metric, where
we used this approximation, with a simulation of the actual metric value had we not used this
approximation. Figure 4.2, shows three pairs of curves where each pair represents the CCDF
of the ratio metric with and without the approximation. The figure shows that as the ACN
transmits in more PN RBs, the approximation becomes less valid. We can also notice that both
the actual curve and the approximated one closely match or are very close if the ACN uses less
than 12% of the PN RBs. Therefore, the ACN should only use less than 12% of the PN RBs,
which is a reasonable assumption when a system wants to achieve covertness.
Now, it is possible to combine the spectrum sensing approach that was discussed in Chapter
2 with the power allocation method to create a complete spectrum access algorithm. Here, the
ACN needs to implement this algorithm at the beginning of each transmission cycle. The
complete algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1.
Using the throughput analysis and the derived two metrics, we can now look at the ACN
system throughput and covertness trade-off. The main question in this type of trade-off analysis
is that if an ACN user needs to maintain, with a certain probability, a specific SINR advantage
over the IR, then what would be the maximum throughput that this ACN user can achieve?
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Figure 4.2: The figure shows a comparison between the approximation of P[GR ≥ η] derived
lower bound and its actual value. We notice that the approximation holds as long as the ACN
does not use more than approximately 12% of the PN RBs, which is a very valid assumption.
Algorithm 1 : ACN Spectrum Access
Initialize:
(
π0,P f a,Pmax, η
)
for n : 1→ N do
Calculate Vn as in (2.2)




Choose up to |A| empty resources
Calculate P∗n as in (4.7)
End of Algorithm
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In Fig. 4.3, we graph the ACN user information theoretic throughput C, scaled by the total
bandwidth of the PN B = 20MHz, as a function of a given covertness requirement; in this case
P[GA ≥ 14]. In this figure, different throughput and covertness values have been obtained by
changing the ACN sensing threshold. It can be noticed that when the PN user density is high,
the ACN throughput is very low and does not significantly vary. This observation is expected
because when the PN has a high density in a certain geographical area, the number of PN RBs
that can be sensed as available by the ACN and used for covert transmission becomes very
scarce. When the density of the PN users is low, we notice that the ACN throughput increases
at the expense of lowering its covertness. In this case, the PN has low number of users per
square area which makes the received energy from those users at the ACN very low. As a
result, the ACN would have the opportunity to transmit in more RBs and achieve a higher
throughput. The downside for the low density of the PN users is that the IR would be more
capable of detecting the presence of the ACN user. One important observation in Fig. 4.3 is
shown when the density of the PN users is medium. Here, the ACN throughput increases then
converges as the covertness decreases. In this type of scenarios it would be infeasible for the
ACN to decrease its covertness in pursuit of higher throughput. In this scenario much of the
ACN potential throughput can be achieved without sacrificing much of its covertness.
Another aspect that can affect the ACN is the effect of the density of the PN users on the
ACN performance. In this regards, Fig. 4.4 shows the ACN scaled throughput as a function
of the PN density. Notice that the ACN throughput rapidly decreases when the PN density
increases. Therefore, knowing the density of the PN at which the ACN will be deployed have
an impact on the performance of the ACN.
4.4 Designing the Covert Network
The metrics discussed in the previous sections can be used to design the ACN. The ratio metric
can be used to determine the distance between a typical ACN-TX and the ACN-RX, ry, relative
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Figure 4.3: The ACN throughput, scaled by its transmission bandwidth, as a function of the
probability of a target covertness level. Different curves represents different densities of the
PN users. The figure shows that sacrificing the ACN covertness for higher throughput is not
always possible, and it only depends on the density of the PN users.
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Figure 4.4: The ACN scaled throughput as a function of the density of the PN users for different
target covertness levels. The ACN throughput rapidly decreases as the density of the PN users
increases.
to that of the ACN-TX and the IR, rv, to achieve certain covertness level. In Fig. 4.5, we choose
µ = 15, and graph ry/rv versus the CCDF of the ratio metric. For the top curve where πs = 1,
the ACN user always transmits in empty PN resources, and, therefore, experiences the highest
SINR; or the highest SNR in this case. In contrast, the bottom curve where πe = 1 represents the
lowest ACN SINR because the ACN user always incorrectly transmits in RF resources that are
occupied by PN users and, therefore, always experiences interference from the PN. The figure
shows that, for the same P[GR > µ], the communication distance between the ACN transmitter
and receiver is larger for the case of πs = 1, and smaller for the case of πe = 1 because the
absence of interference allows the ACN to have the same received signal quality at a longer
distance. In addition, each curve shows that the maximum possible distance between the ACN
transmitter and receiver must be decreased to maintain a high P[GR > µ]. For example, Fig.





























Figure 4.5: The average ACN transmitter-receiver distance (scaled by the distance between the
IR and the ACN transmitter) versus P[GR ≥ 15]. For the top curve, the ACN always transmits
in empty PN resources. For the bottom curve, the ACN always incorrectly transmits in PN
resources occupied by PN users. The curve for any other case falls in between these two
curves.
is 1 because P[GR > µ] = 1 means that the ACN must not be detected by the IR; which can
only happen if either the ACN transmitter-receiver distance is set to zero, i.e., ry = 0, or if the
IR is located at an infinite distance from the ACN transmitter, i.e., rz→∞.
If multiple ACN users needs to operate in the same spatial area, our results can be used to
calculate their maximum number that is permitted under a target level of covertness. In this
regards, consider the ratio metric for the ACN transmitter that is closest to the IR; assume rz
represents the average distance between the IR and this nearest ACN user. According to [43],
the distribution of the distance to the nearest neighbor from an arbitrarily chosen point is given
as: f (ξ) = 2πλC ξe−πλCξ
2
, with a mean of E[ξ] = 1/(2
√
λC). In designing the ACN, E[ξ] can be
thought of as the mean of the distance between the IR and its nearest ACN transmitter, that is,
rz , E[ξ]. Therefore, for a given set of system parameters and a desired P[GR > µ], the distance
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rz can be calculated using the lower bound expression of ratio metric. Then, rz is substituted in
the expression of the mean of the nearest distance distribution to find a bound on the intensity
of the ACN users. Consequently, it becomes possible to quantify the covertness of the ACN
from the perspective of the aggregate metric. For example, if ry = 750m, and the ACN is to
be designed to have P[GR > 15] = 0.96 for πe = 1, then Fig. 4.5 shows that ry/rz = 0.5. Now
rz can be calculated and substituted in the expression of the nearest neighbor to find the ACN
maximum intensity as λC = 10−7. Now it is possible to graph the CDF curve of the aggregate
metric for the calculated intensity and evaluate the ACN covertness from the perspective of the
IR; in our example, λC = 10−7 represents the top curve in Fig. 3.3.
By looking at the bigger picture, we notice that our two covert metrics, along with the re-
source allocation algorithm, can be used for the purpose of designing the ACN. After choosing
the geographical area in which the ACN will be operating, the designer of the ACN begins by
setting the PN main parameters, such as the density of the PN users in that area. This informa-
tion allows the designer to use Fig. 4.5 to find out how far the ACN transmitter can be from the
location of the IR (if that location is known), or what type of precautions need to be taken to
maintain that distance (if the IR location is not exactly known). Next, it would be possible to
use Fig. 4.3 to make tradeoff choices regarding the target covertness. An example to illustrate
this process is as follows: let the PN users’ density be λP = 1.2× 10−5, then the steps of the
example in the previous paragraph can be used to estimate the maximum possible density of
the ACN users; in that case λC = 5.1× 10−7. Next, the ratio metric curve is generated and a
desired P[GR > µ] is chosen; P[GR > 16] for example. Finally, Fig. 4.3 shows the possible
throughput-covertness trade off. So, if the ACN needs to achieve P[GR > 16] = 0.8, the figure




Covert wireless systems that use the radio transmissions of other wireless networks to hide
their signals have been suggested as a mean to increase covertness; however, to the best of
our knowledge, no detailed work has been done to model and analyze such covert systems. In
this paper, we have presented a spectrum access method that would allow an Ad-Hoc covert
network (ACN) to opportunistically access and use the spectrum of an OFDM-based wireless
network for covert communications. We also defined and derived expressions for two metrics
that quantifies the covertness of the ACN from the perspective of an intercept receiver (IR) as
well as an ACN user. Additionally, it has been shown that the covert metrics can be used to
design an ACN to get a specific level of covertness and throughput. This work can be consid-
ered as a foundation for future research on covert systems that can exploit radio transmissions
of other networks to achieve higher covertness.
5.1 Contributions
1. Present and discuss a spectrum access algorithm that allows an ACN user to opportunis-
tically accesses the spectrum of an OFDM-based, multi user, wireless network. The sensing
stage takes advantage of the OFDM nature of the PN signal to perform sensing in the fre-
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quency domain by using the OFDM subcarriers in each PN resource to determine its vacancy.
The ACN user then chooses a subset of the empty PN resources for covert transmission.
2. The covertness of the ACN can be determined by the probability that it can be detected
by an intercept receiver. This probability of detection is related to the IR parameters as well as
the ACN SIR. Therefore, the ACN needs to maintain a lower SIR at the IR in order to achieve
higher covertness. Thus, in order to quantify the covertness of the ACN from the perspective
of an intercept receiver, the ACN SIR is used as a suitable first covert metric; and the metric is
called the aggregate metric. Stochastic geometry is used to derive a closed-form expression for
the CDF of the metric, and it has been shown how to use this metric to estimate the expected
covertness of the ACN.
3. A second metric has been presented and analyzed which captures the performance of a
single ACN user. The second metric, namely the ratio metric, is defined as the ratio between
the SINR of the ACN signal at the intended receiver to that at the IR. When an ACN user
covertly communicate with another user, it tries to achieve the highest data rate, i.e., highest
SINR, at the intended receiver, while minimizing its SINR at the IR. This trade-off between
achieving the highest SINR at the intended receiver and achieving the lowest SINR at the IR
makes the ratio metric very suitable. A lower bound on the CCDF of this metric is derived
using stochastic geometry, and the corresponding performance is analyzed.
4. Finally, we used both metrics to present a comprehensive analysis of the ACN per-
formance and provided a guideline to design the ACN and choose its key parameters based
on the configuration of the OFDM-based PN. We also showed that the spectrum access algo-
rithm, along with the ratio metric, can be used to understand the trade-off between the ACN
covertness and its expected covertness.
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5.2 Areas of Future Work
We consider the work presented in here as a foundation for future study on covert wireless
systems that use the radio transmissions of other wireless networks to hide their signals and
achieve covertness. Therefore, there are several promising research directions that can be fol-
lowed. One particular area that requires further investigation in a future work is the covertness
of the ACN in the presence of multiple intercept receivers. This area has been very well studied
for covert systems that hide their signals in noise; however, to the best of our knowledge, there
is no existing work for systems that exploit the RF band of other wireless networks to achieve
covertness.
Another area for possible research is the coexistence between multiple ACN users. In the
future, it is expected that multiple sensors, multiple IoT devices, or other security devices will
be deployed and some might be required to protect its transmission at the physical layer level. If
those systems are designed to share the spectrum with other existing wireless networks, MAC
protocols need to be designed to allow the covert devices exploit local spectrum opportunities
and share it with minimum inter and intra interference.
Other potential research directions include studying the effect of the mobility of the primary
network and ACN users on the achievable covertness and performance. Also, work is possible
to study the potential benefits and challenges that a covert system can face if the primary
network users are equipped with Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) antennas. When
MIMO beamforming is used by the primary network users, one would expect that more local
spectral opportunities could become available because of the concentration of the radiated
energy from each antenna; however, this potential benefit might decrease the covertness of the
ACN.
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